Why encryption would not have saved General Petraeus (part II)

[Second post in a series on why encryption is not the silver bullet for the case of General Petraeus and Paula Broadwell]

2. Encryption does not hide traffic patterns

The first half of this discussion centered on usability challenges of encrypting email with common cloud-based email providers, and how their web interfaces did not exactly help in this endeavor. It turns out that even for the very patient users willing to invest the extra effort and incur the overhead of setting up encryption, it would have made no difference against the type of surveillance FBI is believed to have conducted in this case.

First the threats sent by Ms. Broadwell to Ms. Kelley had to be readable by the recipient. Even if they were encrypted, Ms. Kelley would have voluntarily revealed their contents to law enforcement since it was at her urging that the FBI began investigating the source of these communications.  NBC coverage suggests that FBI only relied on location history for that account (IP addresses and timestamps) to determine the owner. In fact since it is described as an “anonymous” account, it is possible that Ms. Broadwell limited its use to sending those warning shots, never corresponding with other persons that could link the account to her true identity. In other words, the investigators had to rely on metadata for unmasking the sender.

Once Ms. Broadwell’s identity was established– presumably by obtaining access to other accounts accessed from the same IP addresses– law enforcement had access to correspondence sent from these additional accounts. Let’s suspend disbelief and assume that 100% of communications to/from that account were encrypted. This would not have prevented  obtaining metadata about other email addresses observed to be frequently communicating with Ms. Broadwell and performing similar analysis to establish the link to General Petraeus.

As several commentators pointed out, using an anonymizing proxy such as Tor— even when limited to the one-off email account– could have helped with obscuring IP addresses.

3. Encryption would have drawn more attention to the sender

In reality of course not all of the correspondence discovered in Ms. Broadwell’s account would be encrypted. Most of it is routine chatter with friends and associates that does not warrant the extra hassle of using cryptography. When only a few senders in the address book are using encryption, these contacts immediately stand out. Given Ms. Broadwell’s level of security clearance and access to the inner circle of national security leadership, it would have been an alarming discovery that she is corresponding with unknown individuals from a personal email account using strong cryptography.

It’s a murky picture around the question of whether individuals can be legally compelled to decrypt their own communications to aid an investigation. But once investigators had uncovered a frequent pattern of encrypted traffic between General Petraeus and a suspect in an investigation under suspicion of mishandling classified information, either or both sides of that exchange would come under enormorous pressure to come clean by revealing cleartext version of their correspondence– irrespective of whether they can be forced to, as matter of due process.

CP

Why encryption would not have saved General Petraeus (part I)

The resignation of General Petraeus in the aftermath of details emerging of his correspondence with Paula Broadwell has reinvigorated the debate around privacy of data entrusted to cloud service providers. EFF provided a good summary of discrepancies in existing law, where there are seemingly haphazard exceptions carved for communications stored for more than 180 days or already-opened messages– exceptions that may have made it easier for FBI to obtain access to email exchanges between the general and Ms. Broadwell.

A knee-jerk reaction here is to argue they should have been using encryption all along. But this calls to mind a statement variously attributed to Peter Neumann or Roger Needham: “If you think cryptography is the solution to your problem, you either don’t understand cryptography or you don’t understand your problem.” There are three reasons why encryption is particularly fraught with problems for this use case.

1. Usability challenges. Web email providers for the most part have little or no integration with client-side encryption schemes, such as S/MIME or PGP. The average user of these services has no way to compose an email that is not going to be readable by both the sender and recipient services. This limitation is not to be confused with encryption of content to/from the user to the service. Protecting those links with SSL is standard practice today. (Although that in itself is a relatively new phenomenon– GMail lead the way among major providers by switching on SSL by default in 2010 in the aftermath of the China incident, although niche services such as Hushmail supported SSL going much earlier.)

Part of the fault lies with web browsers: they do not make it easy to exercise the cryptographic capabilities of the underlying OS in a platform-independent way. Speaking of Hushmail, that was an example of an attempt at overcoming the browser limitations using a custom Java-based solution itself authored by Hushmail and later implementing cryptographer server side. In the end it only proved the limitations of the model: because encryption code was provided by Hushmail itself (as opposed to being part of software locally installed on end user machine) at the behest of law enforcement it could be replaced by a Trojaned version that surrendered key material.

It is possible to indirectly use S/MIME or PGP by having a native client installed on the local machine. (Also called “rich client” in come circles, casting aspersions at the quality of web based user-interfaces) Examples of these are Outlook, Mozilla Thunderbird and Eudora. These applications either have built-in support or define an extension mechanism for third-parties to implement strong cryptography. They can also be configured to work with popular cloud providers such as Yahoo or GMail for sending/receiving email.

In this model, the email provider becomes glorified storage box for encrypted content. It has zero visibility into the content of messages exchanged, only seeing an opaque stream of unintelligible ciphertext. The privacy goal is achieved, but at what cost? Encrypted messages can only be sent from machines where email clients are setup and cryptographic keys available. The first limitation means that it is not possible to point any old web browser at mail.google.com to read email. Encrypted messages will appear with blank contents, with the actual ciphertext in an attachment that the service provider can not make sense of. Search over email contents will not work– since original message is not available, it can not be indexed. (Neither will ad targetting, but that is arguably a problem the user cares less about.)

There is also the problem of key management but in this regard General Petraeus and Ms. Broadwell were fortunate. As defense employees, they would be in possession of PIV cards, which are smart-cards that can store cryptographic keys for different purposes: authentication, digital signatures, encryption and even physical access with badge readers. Moreover the widespread use of PIV card for logical access has motivated different vendors to make sure their platform makes it easy to use the cards. Case in point: PIV support is built into Windows 7 with no additional middleware required. In the most likely scenario of two users running Outlook on a recent vintage Windows machine, signing or decrypting a message would be as easy as inserting the card into the reader and typing in the PIN. For two random users without the benefit of a government issued smartcard or an ecosystem shaped by market pressures to support that card, it would be a different magnitude of difficulty trying to decrypt messages on another machine.

[continued]

CP

General Petraeus, FBI and privacy in the cloud

There are a lot of unanswered questions on exactly how FBI unraveled the communications between General Petraeus and his biographer Paula Broadwell.  Were accounts breached due to “user error” in password management, as many quips about enabling 2-factor authentication assume? Or was information subpoeneaed via lawful channels from the service providers? As other critics were quick to point out, the incident is sure to focus attention on the question of exactly how much privacy exists in traffic entrusted to cloud service providers.

First the red herrings. Yes, the general and Ms. Broadwell clumsily attempted to hide their communications by composing messages and saving them as unsent drafts, using the GMail drafts folder as a dropbox. As Chris Soghoian points out, this technique was tried before, by none other than terrorists linked to Al Queda in the past. It did not work– a point that one would assume the person running a US intelligency agency would know by heart. Similarly news accounts imlpy that Broadwell used “anonymous” email accounts. That phrase is ambiguous but in this context it presumably means she used a dedicated account, where the chosen email address and associated profile (providing the name appearing in the “From” field of outbound messages) were made up aliases, lacking any obvious connection to the legal name of the user.

Soghoian’s account has two competing explanations of how that scheme fell apart. The first one from NYT implies that FBI used IP addresses from email threats to identify other accounts used by the same person:

“[…] investigators had to use forensic techniques — including a check of what other e-mail accounts had been accessed from the same computer address — to identify who was writing the e-mails.”

This implies that a very wide net may have been cast during the investigation. Even if the original threats were sent using an account from one email provider, it does not follow that the same person had a second account with the same provider containing her real identity.  Instead law enforcement may be forced to request information from several other providers. To make this more concrete, suppose the threats were sent from an AOL account. (Hypothetically speaking, as this particular detail is not known– earlier allegations that it was GMail were retracted by Wired.) While AOL can provide information from their logs on the IP addresses used to access the sender account, they may have seen no other activity from that address. It could even go in the other direction, where a large amount of activity is observed, which does not permit unique identification. But the same person could have accessed their “true” Yahoo, Hotmail or GMail account from the same IPs. By collecting information from these other providers, the investigators stand a better chance of singling out the suspect. It’s difficult to imagine this happening, considering that at this stage the investigation was purely around email threats to Ms. Kelley and no link to General Petraeus had been established. But emerging information also points to an over-zealous FBI agent that may have taken a personal interest in the case.

The other alternative suggests that no such cross linking was required, and that correlating IP addresses over time was sufficient. Specifically hotel networks are implicated:

“They did that by finding out where the messages were sent from—which cities,
which Wi-Fi locations in hotels. That gave them names, which they then checked
against guest lists from other cities and hotels, looking for common names.”

Once an email is traced back to a particular hotel wireless network, a reasonable hypothesis is that it was a guest staying there. (Granted, this is far from being a slam-dunk conclusion: it could have been a visitor, or friend of a guest for example.) But once multiple data points are available from several hotels, simply taking the intersection of all travellers staying at those hotels could lead to the single person that fits all the data. This would not require casting a wide net across multiple cloud providers, only the hotels implicated in the messages. If the wireless network at each location recorded the MAC address of connecting laptops, it would also be possible to verify that a particular machine indeed accessed that network– assuming no tampering of MAC addresses.

Either way, once Ms. Broadwell’s identity and associated email accounts were revealed, the rest followed quickly. It is clear FBI obtained access to the content of her communications, spent significant time reading through her correspondence and unmasking the identity of her email contacts, leading to the CIA director.

All of this poses one question: is there a way to use cloud services that affords better privacy protection?

CP

Programmable magnetic-stripes: in search of a problem

While chip & PIN and contactless payments are the officially-sanctioned next generation technology for card payments, there is also some incremental innovation happening in the magnetic stripe world.

Programmable magnetic stripes are not exactly new, with the first public descriptions dating back to 2010. There are several companies in the space, although Dynamics appears to be the loudest in term of generating PR. While the standard magnetic stripe on a plastic card represents immutable data that does not change over the life of the card (unless of course the owner is into tinkering with mag-stripe writers) the idea of progammable card is that at different times the card represent different data, based on cardholder actions. For example it could be an office door badge one moment, then become a loyalty card at a store the consumer frequents, and eventually a standard payment card for purchases.

There are a number of technological and design hurdles involved in making this work. First the cards need an internal power source to change the magnetic stripe contents. That means a battery with several constrained physical dimensions, as the thickness of the cards is standardized. Different manufactureres promise several years of lifetime with average usage of the card, suggesting this particular challenge is solved. The more interesting design challenge is how the card contents are modified. This is where the competing solutions go their own ways: some are programmed in advance and present the user a button to switch between different virtual cards, others include bluetooth or NFC, relying on an external device such as smart phone to select the right card with a custom application. Each solution has its own trade offs: due to the lack of sensible UI on the card itself, switching with a button is limited to a small number of options. The phone based solutions are more extensible and allow dynamically provisioning new cards over-the-air but they introduce one more moving piece and point of failure. (“I can’t use my card to pay, because it is stuck in public-transit mode and the phone I use to change it back to credit card is out of battery.”)

The bigger problem is lack of a clear value proposition, beyond the physical aggregation or collapsing multiple cards into a single card.  At the end of the day, transactions are still processed a magnetic stripe swipe. The card can have all types of tamper resistant hardware to properly store its contents when not in use, but at the end of the day the secrets are being spilled out when they are encoded on track data. By itself this would not protect against ATM or credit-card fraud, because payment privileges are encoded using fixed data that can be stolen. (Compare this to how contactless payments work, where even in backwards compatible modes a unique CVV3 for each transaction mitigates the risk of replaying track data.)

Even the aggregation aspect could prove to be a difficult sell for reasons completely unrelated to technology. The reason bank cards have such elaborate designs is all parties share a strong interest in branding. The issuing bank wants its own colors on the front, and the network such as MasterCard wants its logo prominently displayed. While programmable cards can vary the contents of the magnetic stripe, the physical appearance of the card is fixed. That is to say, branding opportunities are limited if at all possible, especially for the open-ended model when new virtual cards can be added after the fact to existing cards.

CP

Clipper cards and transit privacy in the Bay Area

This could also have been called “much ado over Clipper card” history.

A recent cause of civil outrage in the ever-sensitive Bay Area is the discovery that Clipper cards used for MUNI and BART public transit systems store a history of recent locations where the card was used. For a more dramatic demonstration, Bay Citizen points out that the location can also be read using the FareBot application on Android phones. (Sorry, iPhone carrying would-be privacy infringers: no iOS version because Apple has not included NFC in any of their mobile devices yet.)

By conflating several different risks, the article is painting an alarmist picture that is not warranted by the very facts cited. First is the concern that procedures access to transit history can be misused by law enforcement for tracking. This has nothing to do with NFC, the design of the transit card or the way data is stored on the card. For the record, Clipper cards use Mifare DESfire. Data on the cards is divided into sectors, and each sector can be access-controlled to limit read/write operations to parties that possess cryptographic keys. But it is also possible to mark sectors as world-readable, or more precisely readable with default Mifare keys and this appears to be the case for location log. None of this would matter for access by law enforcement, since they would not be trying to scrape history from the card: instead a subpoena would be sent to BART (or Cubic, the company that operates the system, depending on how the process works) to produce this information from logs stored in the backend. Not even microwaving the card itself can stop this. While knowing the Mifare UID of the card can be helpful as an index into the database, it’s conceivable that law enforcement can also uniquely identify a user by providing data points of known locations, without access to the card. For example if it is known the suspect entered 24th St & Mission BART station between 10:00-10:30 and existed Embarcadero between 10:15-11:00. With enough these data points about the person known via other channels, there is likely a single Clipper card satisfying all the constraints.

Given the better known controversy over access to location history from cell phones, there is cause for concern about whether law enforcement would be too eager to request such information. But Bay Citizen itself quotes a spokesperson for the transit agency, putting the number of subpoenas at a whopping three so far. It’s difficult to argue that this constitutes a pattern of abuse.

A second independent risk is other people could attempt to learn the user’s location history by surreptitiously reading the card. As the Farebot developer notes, this would require physical proximity to the card-carrying person as the range of NFC is on the order of several inches without using bulky high-powered equipment. The attacker has to be able to activate the card including powering it via induction field. This is much harder than passively listening to existing communication between a card and NFC reader which is already powering the card. While such passive interception has been demonstrated from much greater distances than intended read range that capability does not help in this case because under normal usage the card-holder would not be performing an operation that reads out history– unless they happen to be running Farebot at the precise instant they are targetted. Even then the logs would be limited by the most recent entries that can be stored on the limited space reserved on the card eg a truncated version of full history where older entries are lost over time.

The other limitation of attacks requiring physical proximity is they do not scale easily and they expose the attacker to greater risk.  If our hypothetical villains were walking around trying to tap people’s pocket with Android phones to read out their location history, they would be expending the same effort to target a second user. (There may be some alternatives to scale the attack at constant cost: for example if an NFC reader is placed at an existing location where users would be inclined to tap their Wallet.) For this reason it is a greater risk for targetted attacks where a small number of useres are singled out for surveillance, as opposed to large-scale tracking. It would be far more efficient to breach the backend databases where all of the information is stored, if the goal is keeping tabs on all users in the system.

In summary, there is little reason to reach for the tinfoil for wrapping transit cards yet.

CP

About those strange P3P compact policies (2/2)

With the background on P3P compact policies covered in the first part of this series, time to answer the vexing question: why do nonsensical P3P policies appear to meet the Internet Explorer privacy settings?

This is partially a consequence of the way IE privacy settings are specified. As described in MSDN, compact policies are evaluated using a rules-based system, triggered by the presence or absence of specific policy tokens. For example the token CUS stands for “customization” and is part of the P3P vocabulary for data collection purposes. Similary FIN is a token indicating the category of data collected, in this case financial information. IE privacy engine is a series of rules where the condition is that presence/absence of some combination of tokens and the action defines what to do with that cookie. For example it is possible to state that if financial data (FIN) is being shared with third-parties (OTR) and the user has no recourse (no presence of LEG token) then reject the cookie.

In principle this mechanism is expressive enough to implement either blacklist or whitelist approach. In the first case, one accepts all policies except those containing certain combination of tokens, which are subject to additional restrictions. In the second case, the browser is more strict and by default rejects/downgrades cookies except when the policy meets a particular criteria. Looking at the medium privacy settings which are the default for Internet zone, IE takes the former approach– the default action attribute is accept.

The catch is that if Internet Explorer runs into unrecognized tokens such as “HONK” it will simply ignore these. The original motivation for this is forward compatibility: IE6 was finalized before P3P standard itself was completed, creating the possibility that the vocabulary could be expanded. In fact even if P3P standard had been finalized as W3C recomendation, that would be version 1.0– future revisions could introduce new tokens, with the result that users running earlier versions of IE would be faced with unrecognized tokens. That mindset is hard to imagine today when software is updated periodically, and often automatically. In 2001 the picture was different, with no monthly patch-Tuesday or near instant Chrome updates.

There is also a correctness problem in ignoring unknown tokens, in conjunction with the blacklisting approach used for settings. Any new token introduced in the spec could have signalled some pernicious data practice worse than those that existing rules were trying to block. Ignoring the new token in that case results in a decision resulting in less privacy and more cookies accepted than intended. This highlights a cultural preference common to MSFT at the time, in favor of failing open, favoring compatibility at all costs over privacy/security. (Trustworthy Computing has been successful in shifting that attitude.)

In reality of course P3P never went anywhere, with the W3C group eventually disbanding in frustration, citing “… insufficient support from current Browser implementers for the implementation of P3P 1.1.” That was 2006. With the vocabulary stabilized, a more strict parser could have been implemented. Even admitting for the possibiltiy of new tokens, sanity checks could have been added: since compact policies are supposed to be derived from a full XML policy, the well-formedness requirement for the XML rules out certain situations such as empty policy without any valid, recognized tokens.

With the perfect hindsight of 10+ years, that is one feature one of the designers regrets not implementing.

CP

About those strange P3P compact policies (1/2)

There are times when past mistakes come back to haunt the designers and developers of a system in unexpected ways. The implementation of the privacy standard P3P in Internet Explorer is proving to be that example for this blogger.

First some background: P3P stands for Platform for Privacy Preferences Project. P3P was forged over a decade ago, amidst the great privacy scares of 2000, in what can be seen as a more innocent/idylic time before September 11 when the greatest threat to online users were evil marketers trying to track users with third-party cookies. Under the charter of the World Wide Web consortium’s Technology and Society group, P3P was an ambitious effort to introduce greater transparency and user control over the collection of information online. In many ways it was also ahead of its time. In the vein of similar initiatives that attempt to prescribe technological fixes to what are fundamentally economic incentive problems, only a tiny fraction of the ideas found their way into widespread implementation. (It would be another 10 years before W3C would dabble on the policy front, with Do-Not-Track, instantly getting mired in as much controversy as P3P in its heyday. To think– DNT introduces just one modest HTTP header representing a yes/no decision. P3P is enormously complex by comparison.

In the original vision, websites express their privacy policies– often couched in legalese and not written with the purpose of informing users– in machine readable XML format. The web browser could then retrieve and compare these policies against the user’s preferences as they navigated to different websites. P3P even proposed a machine-readable standard for expressing user preferences called APPEL, also in XML naturally, which went nowhere. It’s difficult to argue against greater transparency– although several advertising networks managed to do precisely that, out of concern that shining a light into data collection practices could paint an unflattering picture.

Earlier iterations of the protocol also had serious disconnects with the way web browsers operate and their focus on performance. Blocking, synchronous evaluation of privacy policies for every resource associated with a web page, as originally envisioned in the draft spec, would have been an enormous speed penalty. With some reality checks to focus on improved efficiency, attention eventually focused on the perceived privacy boogeyman du jour: HTTP cookies. In order to avoid out-of-band retrieval of privacy statements, compact policies were introduced, as a summary of the full XML policy that could be expressed succinctly in HTTP response headers accompanying cookies. Compact policies are derived from the full XML version via a deterministic transformation. This process is lossy and  produces a worst-case picture: while the full XML format allows specifiying that a particular type of data (say email address) is collected for a specific purpose, retention and third-party usage, the compact policy simply lists all categories, all purposes, retention times etc. as one dimensional list, collapsing such subtle distinctions. Still compact policies could be specified in HTTP headers or even in the body of the HTML document, allowing fast decisions about cookies.

So what was implemented in practice? Internet Explorer ended up being the only web browser supporting P3P and a very specific subset at that: (Full disclosure: this blogger was involved in the standards effort and implementation in IE.)

  • IE uses compact policies for cookie management.
  • IE does not evaluate full XML policies or otherwise act differently based on the presence/absence of that document. It does not even make an attempt to retrieve the XML or verify its consistency against the compact policy. There is an option under the privacy report to retrieve the policy and render it in natural language, if the user went out of their way to ask for it. (Not surprisingly many sites only deployed compact policies, never bothering to publish the XML.)
  • No APPEL or other automatic policy evaluation triggers, for example before submitting a form or logging in to a new service when it would be a useful data point for the user.

Even with this subset, P3P had significant effect on web sites because of its default settings. Belying the assertion that default settings are just that and easily modified by users who disagree with them, the default choice of “medium” privacy became the de facto standard for websites that depended on cookies. First-party cookies were given a wide berth– not requiring a compact policy and permitting existing usage to continue functioning without any changes– third-party cookies without an associated satisfactory were summarily rejected. That means not only advertising networks must implement P3P, they must have a policy that meets the default settings for IE Otherwise all of those banner-ads and iframes with punch-the-monkey animated Flash ads get stripped of their cookies, losing their capability to accurately track distinct users.

This is a great example of regulation by code as Lawrence Lessig described it brilliantly in “Code and other laws of cyberspace.” By choosing a particular default configuration in the most popular web browser, MSFT had established a minimum privacy bar for a segment of the online industry. (The irony is inescapable: at the same time that MSFT was trying to discredit Lessig in the antitrust trial, the engineers were busy providing a textbook example of his central thesis around regulation via West Coast Code.)

[continued]

CP

Secure elements and mobile devices

After the previous post covering NFC modes in Android, time to turn our attention to a closely related subject: the embedded secure element.

In principle a hardware secure element can be viewed as completely independent entity, completely orthogonal to whether there is NFC capability on the same device. Sure enough such a “secure element” already exists in a good chunk of the phones: the lowly SIM card, or UICC as it goes by its formal name, is a type of secure element capable of executing security critical functions. Its raison d’etre is the storage of authentication keys for connecting to GSM networks, a scenario near-and-dear to the mobile carriers. But as is often the case, market demand has influences hardware requirements: the driving force for including an SE (or even a second SE, counting the SIM for GSM devices) is tightly coupled to the primary NFC use case: contactless payments.

The secure element is a system-on-a-chip or SoC– which is to say that it has its own processor, RAM and persistent storage. It can be viewed as a tiny computer inside the main “computer” that is the smart phone. That in itself is not very remarkable, as the average phone contains plenty of such chips: everything from the Bluetooth adapter to the flash controller could arguably meet that definition. What differentiates the secure element?

  1. Locked-down operating sytsem which can not be directly controlled by the host device. In other words, Android OS even with root privileges can not reflash the contents of the SE, read/write out its memory or install new code. (Managing SE requires privileged access authenticated by cryptographic keys for such operations.) For most other chips such restrictions are undesirable. For example, it is important that the Bluetooth controller can have its firmware updated locally as the OEM releases updates or bug fixes.
  2. Hardware tamper-resistance measures designed to guard against attacks that involve direct physical access to the chip. This includes intrusive attacks such as peeling open the chip to try to read its EEPROM directly, or attemptign to cause glitches in the execution by subjecting it to environment stress, heat, over/under power, zap with laser beams etc.
  3. Built-in root of trust, with unique identity. It is possible– for the parties armed with the right cryptographic keys– to authenticate an SE remotely and set up a secure channel where communications to/from that SE are not visible to even the host operating system.

Secure elements appear in any number of different physical form factors, ranging from the very familiar “smartcard” in ID-1 format (typical dimensions of credit-card) to USB tokens employed for authentication in enterprise settings. While these objects seem “large” in relation to the size of a mobile device, it should be noted that the bulk is not taken up by the electronics. (In particular, the brass-colored metal area on a smart card is not the size of the IC– those are the contact points for interfacing with a card reader, for which the dimensions are fixed by international standards.) The chip itself is tiny and continues to shrink over time as fabrication techniques improve. By contrast overall physical dimensions are subject to interop constraints, such as being wide enough to cover a USB slot.

In the spirit of experimentation, different form factors have been tried for incorporating a secure element into a mobile device:

  1. SIM card and its smaller brethren found in iPhone (Becaues the Apple design has to be different and incompatible)
  2. MicroSD cards, which include a secure element such as  Giesecke&Devrient Mobile Security Card and Tyfone SideSafe designs. These combine both mass storage suitable for the SD slot on a phone, as well as a secure element accessed over the same interface. (Tyfone even boasts a version with integrated NFC.)
  3. Embedded SE coupled to NFC controller– this is the Android architecture, where the secure element is part of the phone.

The list does not even include ways that an external SE can be used in conjunction with the  phone. For example there have been mobile payment designs based on stickers, where a sticker containing an SE and integrated NFC antenna is applied to the back of the phone. (These end up being relatively thick, because a layer of ferrite is necessary to separate the antenna from metal on the back of the phone.) Likewise the US government adoption of smartcards with CAC and PIV programs has inspired highly awkward looking sleeves and Bluetooth card-readers designed to allow reading such cards from a mobile device.

CP

Android and NFC modes

Quick note about the different modes for NFC usage supported in Android:

  1. Reader/writer mode. This is probably the most common scenario. The host device functions as the active participant, while on the other side is a passive tag that powered by the induction field generated by the phone. Examples include scanning a URL from a tag (such as Pay-By-Phone stickers on parking meters in SF, or reading information from a US passport) The Android NFC stack provides extensive support for this mode, in callback model: applications can register to receive notifications on discovery of tags, either by NDEF or tag type– such as Mifare classic tags or all ISO 14443 smartcards.
  2. Peer-to-peer, the basis for Android Beam. It is not possible to directly use this mode via Android API either on the sender or recipient side. Instead applications can declare an NDEF record to be transmitted if a beam-transfer is initiated. The stars have to align for this, with another device in RF range of the phone and transfer is confirmed by the user by clicking on the screen at the right instance. (There is also an optimization to register a callback to create that NDEF record on demand, without committing to it in advance.) On the recipient side, Beam is handled directly by the NFC service by invoking the right application.
  3. Card-emulation. In this mode the phone emulates an NFC tag. Specifically for Android card-emulation involves means routing communication from an external NFC reader directly to the embedded secure element, which can appear either as 14443 contactless smart-card or Mifare classic tag. The host operating system is completely out of the picture: the traffic goes direct from the NFC antenna to/from the SE, without traversing the Android path at all. It follows that applications  on the host OS have no control over the data exchanged in this model, except indirectly by influencing the behavior of applets present on SE. Card emulation is used for Google Wallet, to execute contactless payments with secure element as well as offer redemption. By default card emulation state is tied to the state of the screen: CE  is on only when display is on. (As an aside: the screen does not have to be unlocked. This is in contrast from reader/writer mode where the polling loop will not operate when screen is locked. For this reason it is not possible to scan tags without first getting past the Android screen lock, while tap-payments can be initiated by simply turning on the display and holding the reader against an NFC reader.)

Card emulation mode is particularly interesting because it allows the phone to function as a smart-card and substitute for single-purpose dedicated cards that were traditionally used in scenarios such as transit, physical access control and identity/authentication. In other words, subsuming the capabilities of an EMV contactless credit-card is the proverbial tip of the iceberg.

CP

GoDaddy outage and lessons for certificate revocation (2/2)

Windows includes a helpful utility called certutil that serves as a Swiss-army knife for trouble-shooting PKI problems on that platform. One of the options can be used to look at URL cache entries, where previously obtained OCSP and CRLs are stored using the -urlcache option. By running this query and looking for objects associated with GoDaddy one can determine the extent revocation information that would have been available to the client locally, if further network requests were ruled out.

Running this experiment on a couple of actively used Windows 7 machines shows a decidedly mixed record:

  • On one machine there were no GoDaddy entries at all. In this case all revocation checks for GoDaddy sites would have fail.
  • On another laptop, there were two dozen OCSP response as well as CRLs for root and intermediate issuer.

Actively used is the operative keyword here, because paradoxically the effectiveness of revocation checking as implemented on Windows is directly correlated to its frequency of use. The chain-building engine contains sophisticated optimizations on when to prefer CRL over OCSP (if multiple certificates are checked for a given issuer, it become more efficient to download the CRL) and also which issuers are most frequently observed, to allow prefetching those OCSP/CRLs ahead of time before the current ones expires.

(As an aside, this makes revocation checking something of a cooperative enterprise between multiple applications on the machine. Everyone wants to avoid doing a costly CRL/OCSP check over the network, hoping that there is a cached response already in the cache. But to the extent that applications skip revocation checking or instruct CAPI2 to use offline checks based on cached information only, the chances of that happy condition occurring goes down. This is why applications such as Chrome which “defect” from revocation checking are doing a disservice to other applications using the feature.)

The sensitivity of caching to navigation patterns is helpful. Any website the user visits often, will likely have an OCSP response cached, helping tide over any temporary outages of the certificate issuer when visiting those sites again. In fact if the user happened to visit may sites with GoDaddy issued certificates, it may even exceed the threshold where CRL download is triggered, covering all sites– including those not yet visited– affiliated with that issuer. While navigation history is highly clustered around particular sites and this makes the first case realistic, there is no reason to expect any correlation that multiple sites users visit are more likely to have certificates issued by the same CA.

There is one more ray of hope: OCSP stapling. This an SSL extension that permits the server to return a recent OCSP response to the client, saving the client from having to do the lookup on its own. In principle this would also increase resilience against outages of the OCSP responder, as long as the server has a fresh response obtained prior to the outage. (This still has edge-cases around a brand new server being deployed from scratch or perhaps rebooted during the outage. Typically it would need to reach an OCSP responder as part of initialization.) In reality the less-than-stellar uptake of this optimization outside of Windows platform means it would have been of limited use in the GoDaddy debacle. This may change in the near future. For example nginx recently announced support for OCSP stapling.

CP