Blame it on Bitcoin: ransomware and regulation [part II]


Full disclosure: This blogger worked for a regulated US cryptocurrency exchange. All opinions expressed are personal

[continued from part I]

Minding the miners

Miners are arguably the most unwieldy aspect of the system for regulation. On the one hand, mining is highly centralized with a handful of pools located outside the US controlling the majority of bitcoin hash-rate. (Although the recent ban against mining in China may result in an exodus out of that region and perhaps diversify the geographic distribution.) On the other hand, it only takes one miner to make a transaction “official” by including it in a block. All other miners will continue to build on top of that block without judgment, piling on additional confirmations to bury the transaction deeper and deeper into immutable record in the public ledger. That does not bode well for attempts to censor ransomware payments. Even if all ransomware payment addresses were known ahead of time— itself a tall order, given the ease of creating new addresses and a motivated victim who wants the payment to succeed— it is difficult to see how regulatory pressure on miners could achieve sufficient coverage and prevent defectors from including the transaction when doing so would be in their economic interest.

Similar considerations apply to “blacklisting” ransomware addresses and attempting to prevent the crooks from spending their ill-gotten gains. Freezing ransomware funds after they are received by the perpetrators would require at least 51% of mining power agreeing to cooperate to the point of initiating small-forks every time a blacklisted transaction is mined by another miner outside the coalition. (For more on this, see previous blog post on “clean blocks” and censoring transactions.)

Returning to fiat: on-ramps and off-ramps

Notwithstanding enthusiasm about using Bitcoin for retail payments and the occasional short-lived publicity stunt— Tesla’s foray into accepting bitcoin comes to mind— most commercial transactions are still conducted in fiat. While ransomware perpetrators can collect bitcoin from their targets, they still need a way to convert those funds into dollars, euros or more likely rubles. That brings us back to cryptocurrency exchanges. They serve as the on-ramps and off-ramps into the cryptocurrency and present an attractive “choke point” for implementing controls to stop criminals from converting ill-gotten gains into universally accepted fiat currency.

But the same regulated vs off-shore dichotomy complicates this scheme. Regulated exchanges are already incentivized to turn away organizations with dubious source of funds. They implement robust KYC/AML programs to weed out such applicants during on-boarding and continue to monitor for unusual activity, filing CTRs and SARs to alert applicable authorities. The whole point of a compliance department is turning away paying customers when they pose too high a risk, giving up short-term revenue in exchange for long-term health of the business. Unregulated, off-shore exchanges have no such scruples. They are willing to take money from anyone with a pulse and look the other way (or, not bother looking at all) when those customers receive funds that can be traced to criminal activity. Examples:

  • In some cases the willful negligence is an open secret. BTC-e used to rank in the top five of all exchanges in BTC/USD volume. In defiance of the law-of-one-price, bitcoin consistently traded at lower price there than other major exchanges, hinting at a captive audience with nowhere else to go for cashing out their bitcoin. That mystery was explained when BTC-e was shutdown by authorities in 2017, with the founders charged with helping launder stolen funds from Mt Gox.
  • The blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis noted that in 2019 over one-fourth of illicit bitcoin went to Binance. (No surprise that IRS & DOJ are investigating Binance.)
  • In another fine example of investigative journalism, CyberNews posed as a willing accomplice to join a ransomware group and found out the syndicate had access to an insider at an unnamed exchange:

    “Apparently, the cybercriminals had an insider contact at a cryptocurrency exchange who specialized in money anonymisation and would help us safely cash out (and maybe even launder) our future ransom payouts.”

These types of venues are the ideal place for criminal organizations to patronize when it comes to cashing out ransom payments. It would make no sense for DarkSide operators to trade on a regulated exchange such as Coinbase. Even if they managed to get past the onboarding process and transfer bitcoin for sale, there is a high risk their account may be frozen at any point and all funds seized at the behest of US authorities.

The challenge with controlling on/off-ramps into cryptocurrency then is one of jurisdictional reach and enforcement. Raising the bar on existing KYC/AML programs will certainly drive marginal improvements from already compliant exchanges: they may turn away a few more customers from the onboarding queue or file a few more SARs based on tracing blockchain activity. Meanwhile unregulated exchanges will continue to operate under the assumption that they can continue to ignore the new rule-making, relying on the presumed safety of their offshore location and the fiction of not serving US customers (At least US customers who are not savvy enough to use a VPN)

The good news is both problems are actionable: BTC-e was taken down after all, even though it was ostensibly headquartered in Russia. BitMEX is based in the Seychelles and claims to not serve US customers. That has not stopped the US Attorneys for the SDNY from indicting BitMEX executives with violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. There is a good reason for the spotlight to be on cryptocurrency exchanges as an ally in combatting ransomware. If victims can not be prevented from initiating the cycle by paying up, the next best opportunity is to prevent those funds from being converted into fiat. In other words: turn the crooks into involuntary HODLers. (This strategy assumes cryptocurrency will remain primarily a store of value, in other words an inflation hedge or digital gold. If cryptocurrency becomes an efficient method of exchange where a meaningful chunk of commercial transactions can be carried out without taking the “off-ramps” back into fiat, confining criminals to bitcoin will stop being a meaningful strategy.) But that purpose is best served by extending the reach of existing laws on the books to cover offshore exchanges when their involvement in ransomware creates negative externalities that spill over across jurisdictions.

CP

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