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The opinions and views expressed here are my own, and do not reflect those of my employer.
January 2007
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« Nov   Feb »
  • Mark-of-the-web and pinning installers to sites
  • Building quantum canaries and tripwires with smart-contracts
  • CVV1, CVV2, CVV3: Demystifying credit card data (1/2)
  • Off-by-one: the curious case of 2047-bit RSA keys
  • Android RNG vulnerability: when the platform fails
  • Cloud backup and privacy: the problem with SpiderOak (part II)
  • Smart-card logon for OS X (part I)
  • Smart-card logon for OS X (part III)
  • Safenet HSM key-extraction vulnerability (part II)
  • Password management quirks at Fidelity

Standard Disclaimer

The opinions and views expressed here are my own, and do not reflect those of my employer.
January 2007
M T W T F S S
1234567
891011121314
15161718192021
22232425262728
293031  
« Nov   Feb »
  • Mark-of-the-web and pinning installers to sites
  • Building quantum canaries and tripwires with smart-contracts
  • CVV1, CVV2, CVV3: Demystifying credit card data (1/2)
  • Off-by-one: the curious case of 2047-bit RSA keys
  • Android RNG vulnerability: when the platform fails
  • Cloud backup and privacy: the problem with SpiderOak (part II)
  • Smart-card logon for OS X (part I)
  • Smart-card logon for OS X (part III)
  • Safenet HSM key-extraction vulnerability (part II)
  • Password management quirks at Fidelity

Day: January 21, 2007

This is not good

Peter Gutmann’s comments on Vista DRM.

Also, the response on the Vista blog.

cemp

January 21, 2007Cem Paya Leave a comment
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January 2007
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  • Mark-of-the-web and pinning installers to sites
  • Building quantum canaries and tripwires with smart-contracts
  • CVV1, CVV2, CVV3: Demystifying credit card data (1/2)
  • Off-by-one: the curious case of 2047-bit RSA keys
  • Android RNG vulnerability: when the platform fails
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